ANTITHETA:

OR

Political Reasonings:

1. *That Monarchy is the best form of Government.*
2. *That Monarchy is not the best form of Government.*
3. *It is better for the Common-wealth where the Prince is Elective.*
4. *It is worse for the Common-wealth where the Prince is Elective.*

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ANTITHETA:

That Monarchy is the best form of Government.

THis form of Government is most agreeable and consonant to the Law of Nature: We may observe in our own Bodies, that our Life and Spirits are diffused from the Heart unto all other parts of the Body.

It is likewise observable in that admirable *Eutaxie* of the Bees, that they have but one King, to whom by nature they yeeld a strange obedience and subjection, which is most elegantly expressed by the Poet,

Ille operum Custos, illum admiratur & omnes
Circumstant fremitu denso, stipantq; frequentes
Et sæpe attollunt humeris, & corpora bello
Objectant pulchroq; petunt, per vulnera mortem.

It is observed in harmonious musicall Concords, all the Voices depend upon one which seems to rule in chief.

And that which is moſt of all obſervable, in this univerſall frame of the World, all things depend upon one ſupream Governour, which Philoſophers call *Omnium Dominum, factorem Patrem ac Septum ac omnia exiſtentia, & unum omnia exiſtentem.*

For the conſervation of peace and quietneſs in a Common-wealth, the rule of One is better than that of many, for where many govern (their opinions and Intereſts thwart each other) they themſelves likewiſe are ſubject to jarres and diſagreements, and oftentimes have more trouble in compoſing their own quarrels, than in oppoſing the diſſentions of others, and adminiſtring Juſtice to private perſons.

All Power and Rule is vain and uſeleſs without ſtrength, which certainly is more ſtrong and conjoyned in one man, than in being ſhared and divided amongſt many.

It will eaſily be granted by the moſt eager Monarchomachiſts, that the Regall power (if it degenerate) is of all the worſt ; which being granted, it will neceſſarily follow, that Monarchy is in it ſelf the beſt form of Government. For, that which is worſt is oppoſite to that which is beſt, and it is an old *Maxim*, That the corruption of the beſt things is alwayes worſt.

Unum & bonum, are ſo ſtraitly annexed (the Philoſopher ſaith) as they cannot be ſeparated ; but it is evident that a Common-wealth being governed by a King, is more perfectly and properly One, than where the Regall power is divided among many.

In other forms of Government, the Publike affairs are neglected, while each man hopes that his negligence

gence or idleneſs ſhall be ſupplyed by the care and diligence of his fellowes; but a King knowing that the weighty buſineſs of the Common-wealth depends only upon him, will probably be more carefull to perform his truſt.

Iſocrates comparing the Rule by an Ariſtocraticall or Democraticall form of Government with Monarchicall, ſaith excellently; *Theſe being enemies to one another, wiſh that their Predeceſſors and aſſociates in the Rule of the Common-wealth, ſhould govern ill, that they by their managery may receive greater honour and glory; but Kings being all their life uſed to be Lords and Maſters of the Publike affairs, have alway an equall love and affection to the Common-wealth. And that which is moſt of all conſiderable, a King doth take care of the Common-wealth as his own by Propriety, the others as negligent Truſtees.*

Beſide, the Rulers by an Oligarchy or Democracy, by their private diſſentions and ambitious deſigns, do hurt and weaken the Common-wealth; but a King being ſo highly advanced that he need envy none, and not capable of riſing higher, will in all things (as farre as poſſible) take care of the good and intereſt of the Common-wealth: Hence is that which the Prince of Poets ſaith;

Evill is the Rule of many; let there be
One King, one Lord, by Joves appointment he
Doth bear the Scepter, he doth keep in aw
His People, and doth give to them a Law.

That Monarchy is not the beſt form of Government.

IN other forms of Government, the ignorance or ſlackneſs of one Miniſter of State, may be ſupplied by the prudence and diligence of his fellowes: But if a Prince be weake, be negligent, what ſupply? what remedy? Neither is it probable it ſhould be otherwiſe, being brought up in the licence of a high fortune among flatterers, and all his life time immured in his Court as in a Priſon.

The ſimilitude of the naturall Monarchy among the Bees would hold, and it were happy for man-kinde, if (as among them) thoſe of the moſt eminent perfect nature, and moſt fit to command others, were to manage the Publike affairs; but ſince that is not to be found, it is more available for the common good, that what is wanting in one ſhould be ſupplyed by many.

If in other inferiour Offices of the Commonwealth, it is thought fit, that their Power for fear of abuſing it ſhould be divided unto many (it being a true maxime, *deteriores omnes ſumma licentia*, how unreaſonable is it that the Supream Power (on which depends the happineſs or ruin of the Commonwealth) ſhould raſhly be given up into the hands of One!

Beſide, what injuſtice and inequality is it, that one man ſhould ingroſs all the Power, Wealth and Honour in the Commonwealth, being but equall (if not

not inferiour perchance) to many others in Judgment, in Prudence, in Honesty and all other Vertues? Why should one man be a Gyant in the State, and all the rest but Dwarfes? Thus while all Honour and Preferment is straightned as one saith, *in ambitiosam unius Domus ac liminis Angustiam*, other men of excellent parts and accomplishments, knowing that there is no reward for their Vertue how eminent soever they be, grow languid and negligent; and the Prince himself, being arrived at the top of Honour, and accountable for his Actions to none but God, doth most commonly degenerate into rage, licentiousness and Tyrany.

To the Argument of the near connexion of *unum & bonum*, *Malvezzi* answers well; That an univocall riseth but from an univocall, and the unity of the optimate is more univocall to the unity which is required in the People, then the unity of a Monarch is, therefore it is more fit and able to produce it.

That those that say, Monarchy is the best Government, because it is opposite to the worst; may be answered, That they argue *ex non concessis*, it being more probable, that the corruption of an Optimacy is worse than that of a Monarchy, as an evil is much worse as it is multiplyed.

It is better for the Common-wealth, where the Prince is Elective

IT is but by accident that a good Father is bleſt with a good and vertuous Progeny, but what is more dangerous and pernicious for a Common-wealth, than to have its peace aud happineſs depend upon the blind event of Fortune.

And it is obſerved by many, that gallant men are commonly unfortunate in their Progeny, whether it be, that nature having ſpent her ſelf in the production of the Father, growes languid in the Sonne: or by the common condition of all humane things, which are prone as the Poet ſaith,

In pejus ruere & retro ſublata referri.

Others there be who give this reaſon (which indeed ſeems more probable,) that gallant men having high and erected thoughts, do more negligently give themſelves to that low and vulgar drudgery of coition. Hence it is that the Duke of *Rhoan*, conſidering with himſelf, why Monarchies being got by Conqueſt, are not commonly of ſo long continuance as thoſe that are obtained by the eſtabliſhment of good counſell, and founded upon good maximes, gives this reaſon; becauſe great Conquerours, thinking upon nothing but to overcome, and to extend the bounds of their Dominion, and not eſtabliſhing Laws for their ſetling and continuance, have commonly Succeſſors not like to them in vertue and gallantry; and the vanquiſhed not having yet loſt the memory of their former

former Liberty, or their antient Masters, do easily embrace any occasion of change, being freed from the fear of him who did first subject them. But passing by this; Let us suppose that a good King is happy in a gallant and hopefull Child; yet if the Prince die during his Sonnes minority, in what a miserable condition are such a People, who are either to be governed by a Child (which is the greatest Curse that God denounceth against those that are his enemies,) or by a *Protector*, which being a stranger in affection to the Common-wealth, and knowing his Rule to be but of a short date, will strive by rapine and ruine of the publike to advance his own family? Beside, how is it probable that the many-headed multitude, who will scarce obey their lawfull Prince, how wise, how gallant soever he be, should be subject to the Title and shadow of a King?

A King elected by the People, being mindfull of those who raised him to that height, will rule with temper and moderation; whereas he that comes in by succession, does look upon his people as born to slavery and subjection.

In the distribution of petty Offices we observe greater prudence: If the Master of a Ship die, the command of it is not given to his Sonne, but to him that is most knowing in the Art of Navigation.

That King is most happy, when a Prince doth rule such a People as are willing to obey, which certainly cannot be, where a Prince is obtruded upon them by the necessity of a succession.

To these may be added, That it is happy for a Com-

 mon-wealth,

mon-wealth, when the People have a great opinion of the worth and gallantry of their Prince, which certainly is shewed in nothing more, than by their free election. This *Galba* understood, when adopting *Piso* he said, *Generari nasci, a Principibus fortuitum, nec ultra æstimatur adoptandi judicium integrum.*

It is worse for the Common-wealth where the Prince is Elective.

TO the first Argument; It is not probable, that a Sonne sprung from a Noble Family, and brought up by a Vertuous and Gallant Father, should degenerate from his Ancestors: The Linage, and Race naturally is of much force; which the Poet does well expres,

Fortes creantur fortibus, & bonis
Est in Juvenis, est in equis Patrum
Virtus, nec impellem feroces
Progenerant aquila Columbam.

From Gallant, Gallant men proceed;
From Good men, good; the strength of seed
I'the sire, is seen in Horses breed,
Nor doth the Coward Dove, and base,
Spring from the valiant Eagles race.

On the other side; those who from low degree, are elected Princes, bearing a sail too big for their Boat, grow proud and arrogant: As we see oftentimes when

when poor men grow ſuddenly rich, having Honours, grow proud, and unſufferable to their neighbours: Beſides, being in dignity, in the licence of a high Fortune, their manners and diſpoſitions may change; or thoſe faults and enormities which lay hid under the lowneſs of a private roof, may lie open, and diſcover themſelves in a Palace.

To this may be added that in the election of the Prince, the ſuffrages of the moſt wiſe and good men, may be outwaighed by the bad and ignorant, of which there is commonly the greater number; ſo that out of ſympathy of condition, they will chooſe one moſt like themſelves.

Moreover; The People do give a greater reſpect and reverence to a Prince that is deſcended from a Royall Progenie, and do bear (as *Montanus* ſaith well) *æquiori animo quem Princeps infeliciter genuit, quam qui electus eſt non male.*

But that which is yet more conſiderable is; that the Regall Power being hereditary, there can be no vacancy of a King, which is the greateſt happineſs that can happen to a Common-wealth; for by this means, all the diſputes and contentions concerning Succeſſion, are taken away, which will neceſſarily follow if the Prince be Elective.

Beſides, They who are to leave their Power to their Heirs, do more diligently take care of the Publike affairs as their own, while others neglect them, knowing their Power to be limited, within the ſhort and uncertain ſpan of Life.

To thoſe which ſay (which is formerly intimated) that Election is in our power, but Succeſſion is

in the power of Fortune, may be anſwered: That by experience we may finde (which in theſe diſcourſes is of more force than the moſt ſubtill ſpeculations in Philoſophy) worſe Princes Elected than ever came in by Succeſſion. Among the Romans, what monſters of men did the Souldiers Elect? We may inſtance in a few; as *Claudius, Otho, Vitellius, Heliogabalus.*

Among other reaſonings againſt Election, *Virgillio Malvezzi*, a Learned Italian Lord, adds one of no ſmall weight. *They who come in by Election* (ſaith he) *not having Education in the Princes houſe, can have but a mean information of the affairs of State; where if Sonnes ſucceed, as no new dignity accrues unto them: ſo no occaſion of growing proud befalls them; and being trained up, and acquainted with affairs, as they themſelves will be better able to govern: ſo both People and Nobility, will be willinger to be governed by them; the People as having been accuſtomed to obey their Fathers; the Nobility, as being removed from equality.*

Moreover, They who come in by election, by all wayes of Flattery and Bribery, ingratiate themſelves to thoſe, who are like to be their Succeſſors, and connive at their faults, that having them their friends, they may ſecure unto their Poſterity what they have got by violence and rapine.

To theſe Arguments *Barklay* adds one worthy our conſideration; *There are many works* (ſaith he) *and intentions, which cannot as ſoon as they are conceived perfect the Common-wealth, but muſt have ripeneſs, and upon ſuch Counſell of long expectation does the ſafety*

of the Common-wealth depend. These purposes are oftentimes neglected and omitted, either through envy or malice by those Kings, that rule not by Inheritance, but by Succession.

To that Argument of a Childe governed by a *Protector*, if the King die during the minority of his Sonne, this may be said in way of answer. That (considering the nature of man, with the frailty of all humane Policy) there is no form of Government imaginable, so simply and absolutely good, as not to be subject to some miscarriages; and therefore that way is best, which is obnoxious to least inconveniencies, and neerest to perfection; which thing being granted, it will seem more probable, that a King for his Posterities sake, should choose an honest and wise Protector, than a factious Senate, or the giddy headed multitude should elect a good and wise Prince.

To the other Argument it will be confest, that Prince to be most happy, who as the Poet saith, *volentes per populos dat jura*; but this must be restrained by the consideration of the genius of the People which are to be subject; for most Nations are of that temper which the Historian describes, *qui nec totam libertatem ferre possunt, nec totam servitutem*, and therefore are to be governed neither by too strict, nor too remiss a hand.

FINIS.